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Case Comments
The Anti-Inflation Case: The shutters are closed
but the back door is wide open
By PIERRE PATENAUDE*
At the dawn of Confederation, conflicting interpretations were given to
the text of the new constitution. Sir John A. Macdonald insisted on the
importance of the general power, while Sir Georges Etienne Cartier empha-
sized the sovereignty of the local states and federalism. Indeed, for the Qu6-
b~cois, the federal principle, with its division of exclusive legislative powers,
could be seen as the realization of their political dream: national sovereignty
over subject matters essential to the preservation of their identity. An excerpt
from the July 1, 1867 edition of La Minerve illustrates this:
The new Constitution recognized the French Canadians as a distinct and separate
nationality. We constitute a state within a state. We enjoy the full exercise of our
rights, and the formal recognition of our national independence.
Not everybody agreed with this opinion which was being presented to
the Qu6b6cois. Indeed, Sir John A. Macdonald hoped for a unitary state and
had described how the general clause would bring about such a system in a
December 19, 1865 letter to Cameron, Grand Master of the Orange Lodge:
If the Confederation goes on, you, if spared to the ordinary age of man, will see
both local Parliaments and Governments absorbed in the General Power. This
is as plain to me as if I saw it accomplished now - of course it does not do to
adopt that point of view in discussing the subject in Lower Canada.
That last sentence clearly indicates that the new constitution was founded
on a misunderstanding. This fundamental ambiguity has continued until now.
One of the areas where it is most evident is in the interpretation of the
"peace, order, and good government," or P.O.G.G., clause.
Rarely has there been as great a gap between the two political philoso-
phies of federalism as in the Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act1 case. Two
diametrically opposed views of Canadian federalism and the "national dimen-
sions" doctrine underlined the two principal judgments of the case: Chief
Justice Laskin's judgment reflected a centralist political philosophy combined
with a common law lawyer's empiricism and lack of limpidity, while Justice
Beetz's classical federalist philosophy, more akin to the efforts of the Judicial
@Copyright, Pierre Patenaude, 1977.
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Committee of the Privy Council to protect the local states' autonomy and to
K.C. Wheare's ideal of a pure federal state, was expressed with an effort at
rationalization characteristic of one trained in the civil law system.
The Anti-Inflation Act2 provides for price and income controls, in both
the private and public sectors of the economy, in areas of provincial compe-
tence as well as federal jurisdiction. The preamble explains that "the Parlia-
ment of Canada recognizes that inflation in Canada at current levels is contrary
to the interests of all Canadians and that the containment and reduction of
inflation has become a matter of serious national concern."
To support the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney-General of
Canada relied on a concept known as the "national dimensions" doctrine,
according to which a subject matter originally falling under s. 92 of the
British North America Act,3 and consequently of exclusive provincial juris-
diction, may attain such a national scope that it becomes a matter of federal
jurisdiction. The central government had hoped for a judicial consecration
of that sweeping power which could in the future have been used to cam-
ouflage constant federal invasions of provincial jurisdiction. This diffuse
"national dimensions" doctrine may have been established by the long-
contradicted case of Russell v. The Queen4 and, in any case, was resurrected
in Attorney-General of Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation which
refused to overthrow the Russell judgment. Several years later, Canada Tem-
perance Federation was impliedly disapproved in Canadian Federation of
Agriculture v. Attorney-General of Quebec.6 Had this doctrine not been
accepted by the Court in the Anti-Inflation case, the Attorney-General of
Canada urged, in the alternative, that an economic crisis amounting to an
emergency warranted resort to the "national emergency" doctrine.
The Chief Justice's Judgment: A Centralist's View
In spite of the fact that the Chief Justice stated that he would give his
judgment on the basis of the "national emergency" doctrine and that "it
becomes unnecessary to consider the broader ground advanced in its sup-
port,"7 there were some very important obiter dicta concerning the "national
dimensions" doctrine in his judgment. For one who had commented on one
of the most centralist judgments of the Judicial Committee in the following
terms, "Viscount Simon's opinion in the Canada Temperance Federation case
may be likened to the removal of shutters from a house which has been kept
dark for many years," 8 it must have been disappointing to see a majority of
the Court close the shutters by rejecting the "national dimensions" doctrine.
2 S.C. 1975-76, c. 75.
3 (1867), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
4 (1882), 7 A.C. 829.
5 [1946] A.C. 193; [1946] 2 D.L.R. 1; [1946] 2 W.W.R. 1.
6 [1951] A.C. 179.
7Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 1 at 419 (S.C.R.); 493 (D.L.R.);
584 (N.R.).
8 Laskin, "Peace, Order and Good Government" Re-examined (1947), 25 Can. Bar
Rev. 1054 at 1080.
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Indeed, that is why the Chief Justice clearly stated that the "national dimen-
sions" doctrine should not be nailed down, so as to be able to use it when
necessary."
One way still existed to preserve the right to infringe upon the exclusive
powers of the provinces: it was to enlarge the applicability of the "national
emergency" doctrine. The Chief Justice simply had to state, first, that there
was no difference in nature between the "national dimensions" and the
"emergency" doctrines, except one of degree,' 0 then use the word "crisis"
instead of "emergency," and finally, apply the same standards to a peacetime
problem as those elaborated by the Judicial Committee for wartime legisla-
tion - thereby opening the back door instead of the shutters.
Having thus opened the back door by using the "emergency" doctrine
for a peacetime situation, the Chief Justice then analyzed the use of extrinsic
evidence. Its only application, according to him, was to prove that Parlia-
ment might have had certain reasons to believe that a piece of legislation
would be useful to solve a serious national condition:
In considering such material and assessing its weight, the Court does not look
at it in terms of whether it provides proof of the exceptional circumstances as a
matter of fact. The matter concerns social and economic policy and hence govern-
mental and legislative judgment. It may be that the existence of exceptional cir-
cumstances is so notorious as to enable the Court, of its own motion, to take
judicial notice of them without reliance on extrinsic material to inform it. Where
this is not so evident, the extrinsic material need go only so far as to persuade the
Court that there is a rational basis for the legislation which it is attributing to
the head of power invoked in this case in support of its validity."
According to that rule, the evidence submitted by the parties lost much of its
effectiveness:
The economic judgment can be taken into account as an element in arriving at
an answer to the question whether there is a rational basis for the governmental
and legislative judgment exercised in the enactment of the Anti-Inflation Act.
It cannot determine the answer.
In my opinion, this Court would be unjustified in concluding, on the sub-
missions in this case and on all the materials put before it, that the Parliament of
Canada did not have a rational basis for regarding the Anti-Inflation Act as a
measure which, in its judgment, was temporarily necessary to meet a situation of
economic crisis imperilling the well-being of the people of Canada as a whole
and requiring Parliament's stern intervention in the interests of the country as
a whole.' 2
9 Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 1 at 412 (S.C.R.); 487 (D.L.R.); 578
(N.R.). "It is my view that a similar approach of caution is demanded even today, both
against a loose and unrestricted scope of the general power and against a fixity of its
scope that would preclude resort to it in circumstances now unforeseen." At 415 (S.C.R.);
489 (D.L.R.); 580 (N.R.). ". . . I emphasize again the point made earlier that it would
be unwise to nail down any head of legislative power in such firm fashion as to make it
incapable of application to situations as yet unforeseen."
:OId. at 411 (S.C.R.); 486 (D.L.R.); 577 (N.R.). "What emerges from the lines
of cases up to the Snider case are differences more of degree than of kind about the
scope of the federal general power."
nId. at 423 (S.C.R.); 495-96 (D.L.R.); 587 (N.R.).
12 d. at 425 (S.C.R.); 497-98 (D.L.R.); 589-90 (N.R.).
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The onus of proof imposed on the parties was tantamount to the crea-
tion of a quasi-irrebutable presumption of validity in favour of any federal
law founded on an "emergency." Indeed, it is much more difficult to prove
the absence of "a rational basis for the governmental and legislative judg-
ment"'18 than to prove that there was no emergency. The facts in the present
case demonstrate the extreme difficulty in proving the unconstitutionality of
a federal law founded on an "emergency."
The fundamental question which should have been asked was whether
the onus of proof should have rested on the shoulders of the government
which had made a dramatic alteration to the division of powers in a peace-
time situation. The Supreme Court of Canada was not compelled to apply
to a peacetime problem the same rules as those formerly elaborated in war-
time and postwar situations. Stare decisis exists only in similar cases: in the
present instance, there was no situation as serious as war.14
One may agree that sometimes a peacetime crisis may become more
important than war. In that case, the courts could take judicial notice of such
an emergency. It was certainly not the case in the present situation; the law,
on its face, was unconstitutional unless an emergency existed and the Court
should not have used the "very clear evidence" test. It should have recognized
that this exceptional rule had only been applied in wartime, a situation which
then clearly created a presumption of emergency.
But in peacetime, would not the situation be different? What would be
the extent of a "crisis" that would warrant the invocation of the "emergency"
doctrine so as to destroy the autonomy of the local states? The federal struc-
ture of Canada, which rests on the respect for the sovereignty of local states
within their jurisdictionsA5 and, as a corollary, on the exclusivity of fields ofjurisdiction,' 6 has been too easily forgotten in this case. Instead, the con-
cession of this exorbitant power to the federal authorities rested purely on
political motives: the "necessity" of a powerful central authority to solve
"serious national condition[s]. 17
Indeed, the majority of the Court did not even require a clear declara-
tion by Parliament that it intended to cure an emergency. In other words,
Parliament did not have to state clearly that an emergency existed or was
foreseen. It simply had to invade the provinces' jurisdiction, wait to see if
this move would be contested, and, if it was, plead that a "crisis" or "excep-
13 Id.
14 See, for example, Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press
Co. Ltd. et al., [1923] A.C. 69; Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians et al. v.
Attorney-General of Canada et al., [1947] A.C. 87; In the Matter of a Reference as to
the Validity of the Wartime Leasehold Regulations, [1950] S.C.R. 124.
15 Maritime Bank v. Receiver General of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437.
1'Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326;
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 673; [1937] 1 W.W.R. 299; Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorneys-
General of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, [1898] A.C. 700.
17 Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 1 at 423 (S.C.R.); 495 (D.L.R.);
587 (N.R.).
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tional circumstances"' 8 existed, thereby reversing the onus of proof. The onus
would then be on the challengers to prove that Parliament could not have
had a rational basis to intervene. In the future, the federal government, for
more certainty, could accompany any similar law temporarily destroying the
constitution with a White Paper stating that its law is not futile and send
civil servants to give speeches on the necessity of the said law ... !19
Beetz's Judgment: The Defence of Federalism
Beetz J. articulately conceptualized an interpretation of the "peace,
order, and good government" clause which would respect the fundamental
principle of the Canadian constitution - federalism. He emphasized the
difference in nature between the "national dimension" doctrine and the
"emergency" doctrine: while the first brings a permanent modification of the
division of legislative powers, the second is, in essence, temporary.
Extrapolating the implications of an acceptance of the "national dimen-
sions" doctrine, wherein the judiciary would permit the federal Parliament
to trench upon exclusive provincial jurisdiction as soon as a problem attains
more than a local dimension, Mr. Justice Beetz foresaw that "a fundamental
feature of the Constitution, its federal nature, the distribution of powers be-
tween Parliament and the provincial legislatures, would disappear, not gradu-
ally but rapidly." 20
Proceeding on this assumption, Beetz J. analyzed the earlier cases on
the subject and concluded that they were totally incompatible with the exist-
ence of a "national dimensions" doctrine. He explained that this expression
had been used in cases involving aeronautics,21 radio communications, 22 and
the national capital area23 only because these cases had applied the "peace,
order, and good government" clause in its residual character: each of these
new subject matters "had a degree of unity that made it distinct from provin-
cial matters and a sufficient consistence to retain the bounds of form. 24
Because of their distinctiveness and their unseverabiity, those new subject
matters which had not been foreseen in 1867 fell under the residual power
and, due to their extra-local dimension, under the federal residual power
instead of that of the provinces.
18 Id.
19 The Attorney-General of Canada, in the instant reference, relied on the federal
government's White Paper entitled "Attack on Inflation" and on a speech delivered by
the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Gerald Bouey.
20 Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 1 at 445 (S.C.R.); 514 (D.L.R.);
607 (N.R.).
21 Re Aerial Navigation, Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Onta-
rio, [1932] A.C. 54; [1932] 1 D.L.R. 58; [1931] 3 W.W.R. 625. Sub nom. Re Regulation
and Control of Aeronautics in Canada.
2 Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication, Attorney-General of
Quebec v. Attorney-General of Canada et al., [1932] A.C. 304; [1932] 2 D.L.R. 81;
[1932] 1 W.W.R. 563.
2 3 Munro v. National Capital Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 753.
24Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 1 at 458 (S.C.R.); 524 (D.L.R.);
618 (N.R.).
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As for inflation, Beetz J. considered that it did not have sufficient speci-
ficity and distinctiveness to become a new subject matter. Consequently, the
Anti-Inflation Act could not be grounded on the federal residual clause.
Just as the Chief Justice's reluctance to repudiate the "national dimen-
sions" doctrine could have been foreseen by reading the works he had pub-
lished when he was an academic, 25 so, too, Beetz's judgment might have been
predicted. Indeed, he had clearly stated the dangers of the national dimension
doctrine in 1965.
C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'entre la notion d' "tat d'urgence," qui est relative
mais qui est susceptible d'une appreciation assez precise, et cello des "dimensions
nationales," dun probl~me, qui est purement relative et d'application toujours
discutable, les Qu6becois auront une tendance A pr~frer celle d'6tat d'urgence A
celle des dimensions nationales, tout simplement parce que la premiere so ra-
tionalise comme une suspension provisoire de la constitution, tandis que 'autre
risque de se solder par une modification permanente, au profit du pouvoir f~d6ral,
de l'am6nagement des comp6tences. C'est ainsi que le juriste qu6becois ne peut
so montrer que m~fiant i l'endroit de la those selon laquelle, par exemple, ]a
competence legislative dot 6tre h la mesure du problme h r~soudre. I1 lui semble
d'abord que ce n'est pas un argument juridique, mais une raison politique et fonc-
tionnelle de modifier, s'il y a lieu, la constitution. I1 lui paralt ensuite, d'un point
de vue politique, que c'est lh un argument permanent, favorable At la concentration
f~drale des comp6tences, car il est 6vident que les probl6mes h r6soudro ne ces-
seront de croitre en intensitd, en complexit6 et par leurs ramifications....
Enfin le juriste qu6becois ne peut que se troubler devant l'attitude de certains
juristes canadiens qui ou bien se contentent de crit~res surtout quantitatifs pour
d6terminer la validitd des lois dont la constitutionnalit6 est mise en doute ou bien
prennent plaisir A souligner le degr6 considerable d'intuition qui entre en jeu dans
l'interpr6tation judiciaire de la constitution. L'attitude de ces juristes ... peut
provoquer une confusion entre la science politique et le droit, et entralner une
d~mission de l'esprit d'analyse et une renonciation i la conceptualisation, tous
deux indispensables A la f6condit6 du droit.26
If Beetz's interpretation of the "peace, order, and good government"
clause is accepted in the future by the Supreme Court, and five out of nine
judges have done so in the present reference, all subject matters which have a
distinct nature, an unseverable character, a national scope, and which were
overlooked or not foreseen in the enumerated heads of either ss. 91, 92, or
93, would fall under the federal residual clause. The privilege of paramountcy
would also be attached to them.
But from now on, the question is how is one to separate the sheep from
the goats? 27 What will be the norms used to distinguish the subject matters
falling under the federal residual clause from other severable subject mat-
ters? Federal authorities may no longer have the capacity to legislate with
respect to federal parks unless they are considered to be new subject matter.
Would the declaratory statute called the Holidays Act,28 which makes the
25 Laskin, supra, note 8.
26 Beetz, "Les attitudes changeantes du Qu6bec h 1'endroit do la constitution de
1867" in P.A. Crepeau and C.B. MacPherson, eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) at 120-21.
27 On this point see A. Abel, The Anti-Inflation Act Judgment: Right Answer to
the Wrong Question (1976), 26 U. of T.L.J. 409.
28 R.S.C. 1970, c. H-7.
[VOL. 15, No. 2
Case Comments
first day of July a legal holiday, be considered as falling under a new non-
severable subject matter? If not, the Act is ultra vires! If the Supreme Court
applies the Munro29 rationale liberally to these cases and extends the possi-
bilities of creating such new subject matters, then Professor Peter Russell
would be correct in his contention that "[i]n the hands of a nationally minded
court it may be surprising what turns out to be specific enough to come under
the federal residual power."30
Analysis of the Two Different Approaches of Laskin C.J. and Beetz J.
The different approaches of these two Canadian constitutional law ex-
perts are interesting because they are good representatives of the two frames
of mind which exist in Canadian law. Indeed, the two components of the
Canadian federal state have conflicting visions of political structures and very
distinct approaches to the concept and role of authority. While the French
Canadians are subject to a law elaborated by the experts and approved by
Parliament, the English common law has its roots in the customs of the
people: the former is an institutional society, the latter an individualistic one.
French Canadians generally either adhere to or have been moulded by the
traditions and views of the Roman Catholic Church, a very structured mono-
centric organization; Anglo-Canadians, who are influenced by more religious
diversity, are used to a polycentric religious structure. Even language is a
mirror of this profound dichotomy: while English evolves according to its
generally accepted use, the Acad6mie Frangaise dictates how French should
be used.
These differences have tainted the evolution of Canadian constitutional
law in recent years. While French Canadians have always insisted on formal
modifications of the British North America Act, the federal authorities, con-
trolled by English Canadians, have answered by administrative palliatives.
Such temporary agreements seem adequate to common law lawyers used to a
law that evolved according to the needs of the time but appear fragile to
jurists influenced by a continental tradition established on fundamental prin-
ciples.
In the same way, while Beetz's judgment clarifies the interpretation to be
given to the P.O.G.G. clause, it also seems to determine its applicability for
the future; Laskin C.J. prefers a pragmatic approach which gives no deter-
mined application to the clause so that it may be applied according to the
needs of the moment.
Ritchie's Judgment: Ambiguity
There is little to say about Mr. Justice Ritchie's judgment except that
it is incomplete and may create some ambiguity. Clearly he rejected the na-
tional dimensions theory:
It is not difficult to envisage many different circumstances which would give rise
9 Supra, note 23.
20 P. Russell, The Anti-Inflation Case: The Anatomy of a Constitutional Decision,
paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Fredericton, N.B., June,
1977 at 17.
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to national concern, but at least since the Japanese Canadians case, I take it to
be established that unless such concern is made manifest by circumstances amount-
ing to a national emergency, Parliament is not endowed under the cloak of the
"peace, order and good government" clause with the authority to legislate in
relation to matters reserved to the Provinces under s. 92 of the British North
America Act, 1867 .... 81
Unfortunately, Ritchie J. did not indicate how he could have interpreted
the Aeronautics,82 Radios and Munro4 cases which were decided on the
basis of the "peace, order, and good government" clause when there was no
emergency. However, he stated that he was in agreement with the opinion
of Beetz J.35
Ritchie J. then went on to imply that the fact that there was a "serious
national concern" was synonymous with a "national emergency."' s The line
of demarcation between the rejected "national dimensions" doctrine and this
"emergency" doctrine becomes very thin. Beetz J. had foreseen this when he
asked:
The Canada Water Act, . . . on the constitutionality of which, again I refrain
from expressing any view, contains a preamble where it is stated that pollution
of water resources of Canada has become "a matter of urgent national concern."
Is the Canada Water Act an emergency measure in the constitutional sense? ...
How is a matter of serious national concern to be distinguished from a matter of
urgent national concern?37
Has the Supreme Court of Canada really gathered to bury the "national di-
mensions" doctrine?38 The answer is certainly not clear.
Conclusions
If Canada was a country with an unwritten constitution and with but a
single national group, the Chief Justice's plea against a fixity of the scope of
the federal Parliament's general power and its restriction to emergency situa-
tions would be reasonable. But that is not the case: some of the components
of Canada, mainly Qu6bec because of its special socio-cultural status, agreed
to join in this federal scheme only on the assumption that they would retain
exclusive legislative jurisdiction on matters which, at the time of Confedera-
tion, seemed essential to their cultural distinction - primarily education,
property, and civil rights:
C'est un fait historique ind6niable que le Bas-Canada d'alors, l'actuelle province
de Qu6bec, accepta Ia Conf&I6ration parce que ses repr~sentants dtaient con-
31 Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 1 at 437 (S.C.R.) 507 (D.L.R.);
599-600 (N.R.).
32 Supra, note 21.
3 3 Supra, note 22.
34 Supra, note 23.
35Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 1 at 437 (S.C.R.); 507 (D.L.R.);
600 (N.R.).
361d. at 439 (S.C.R.); 509 (D.L.R.); 601 (N.R.).
371d. at 467 (S.C.R.); 531 (D.L.R.); 626 (N.R.).
38F. Chevrette and H. Marx, Comment (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev 732.
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valncus que cette quatriime Constitution lul conservait tous lea droits que lui
avalent donn6s les Capitulations, le Tralt6 de Paris et surtout l'Acte de Quibec.89
The Qudb6cois would not have accepted that the central authority would
be permitted to invade provincial jurisdiction when one of the aspects of these
fields of jurisdiction had attained a dimension of interest to the whole coun-
try. The letter from Macdonald to Cameron substantiates this fact. Surely,
the Qu6bMcois would not have fought for centuries for their national inde-
pendence on these subject matters to see it lost for a purely practical reason.
Beetz's judgment may appear to be technical and restrictive, but it gives the
only interpretation to "peace, order, and good government" which is com-
patible with federalism.
The federal constitution is a fundamental text, representing the agree-
ment of the original states and of two nations to live together on certain basic
principles. Such principles are ordinarily incorporated into the text so as to
protect the weak against the strong, and in the Canadian structure, the na-
tional state of French Canadianm is the weak component. The individual
provinces are also weak in comparison to the central government's financial
and political strength. If recognition were given to the possibility that the
government of the majority would invade provincial jurisdiction by asserting
that the subject matter extended beyond a local scope, then the federal gov-
ernment could achieve complete centralization and the two-hundred-year
long combat by French Canadian.s td gain control of their fields of jurisdic-
tion would fail. 1ferhaps Viscount Haldane "gave his decisios in terms of
cold abstract logic, purporting to find its points of reference within the four
corners of the B.N.A. Act, and uninformed and unnourished by any facts of
Canadian living which might have afforded a rational basis for his constitu-
tional determinations,"" but the result of his judgments was the consecration
of a federally-based system.
It is not an acceptance of the "national dimensions" doctrine which
would permit the con-tution to be regarded '"as a resilient instrument capa-
ble of adaptation to changing circumstances,"" or that would persuade the
provinces to relinquish their sovereign powers. Indeed, the mere fact that
this "instrument capable of adaptation to changing circumstances" would be
so adapted according to the will of the most powerful political structure,
would render aleatory the protection accorded to the Quebec nation by the
constitution.
. Finally, when one realizes how the judgments of Laskin CJ.C. and Beetz
J. are natural consequences of their prior writings and philosophy, one be-
comes aware of the importance of the choice of judges of the Supreme Court
for the evolution of our constitution. This power of appointment is still ex-
clusively in the hands of the federal executive, which is one of the litigants in
most constitutional issues!
s9 P.B. Mignault, Nos problenes conitutionneL ( 1937-38), 16 La Revue du Droit
577 at 587.
40 Laskin, supra, note 8 at 487.
41 Reterence Re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note I at 412 (S.C.R.); 487 (D.L.R.);
578 (N.R.).
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